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1 Introduction
Roux introduced the notion of the “arbitrariness vortex”
1
 to illustrate his observation 
that the constitutional court’s FNB decision
2
 could “telescope many of the issues that 
might have been addressed (and in comparative constitutional law are addressed) 
at other stages of the property clause inquiry into [the arbitrariness] stage” or, as he 
describes it elsewhere, of “sucking the [whole property] inquiry into the arbitrariness 
test”.
3
 Crucial to the idea of a vortex is that what is perceived as the crux of a section 
25 dispute, namely the balancing of individual property interests and the public 
interest, is “sucked into” just one stage or part of a section 25 challenge,
4
 instead of 
taking place in or being spread over several discrete stages or parts of the inquiry.
According to Roux, the six stages at which constitutional property disputes could 
be decided
5 respectively involve the questions whether (1) the right or interest 
involved is constitutional property;
6
 (2) the impugned law authorises deprivation 
of that property; (3) the authorised deprivation of property is arbitrary; (4) the law 
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1 English dictionaries define a vortex (specialist) as a mass of air, water, etc that spins around very 
fast and pulls other objects into its (empty) centre; see eg the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/vortex; Cambridge Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary & Thesaurus at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/vortex (3-12-2015). 
2 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC).
3 Roux “Property” in Woolman, Roux and Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2003) 
46-2, 46-20. 
4 Describing the FNB questions (see n 5 below) as “stages” is potentially confusing, since it evokes 
the related but distinct “telescoping” effect that the arbitrariness test allegedly also has on the two 
main stages of a constitutional challenge, a context in which the notion of “stages” of a constitutional 
challenge goes beyond s 25, property and the FNB case. In a property dispute, these two stages 
involve proof of a non-compliant deprivation or expropriation in terms of s 25 and the possibility of 
justifying it in terms of s 36 respectively; see the discussion below. To avoid confusion I generally 
avoid the term “stages” and refer to the “FNB questions” or “inquiries”.
5 Roux (n 3) 46-2, 46-20. Roux bases his analysis on the seven questions set out in the FNB case (n 
2) par 46. The FNB list is longer because the s 36 justification question features twice, at (4) for 
arbitrary deprivation and again at (7) for non-compliant expropriation. A question that neither Roux 
nor the FNB case lists specifically but that both he and the FNB case consider separately (as an 
application issue and a preliminary issue respectively; see Roux (n 3) 46-6; the FNB case (n 2) par 
41-45) is that of beneficiaries. As appears from the discussion below, the beneficiaries issue could be 
seen as a discrete issue that might also be sucked into the arbitrariness vortex, with much the same 
implications.
6 The point is discussed again below, but it bears mentioning early on that the issue in s 25 cases 
is not “property” in its relatively restricted, private-law sense (saaklike regte) but particularly 
constitutional property, which is a wider concept that extends beyond private-law property interests 
and includes at least some personal and public-law rights. See par 2.4, 3.3 below for references.
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in question provides for expropriation of property; (5) the amount, time and manner 
of payment of compensation for expropriation comply with the requirements in 
section 25(2)-(3); and (6) any deviation from the property clause standard (for either 
deprivation or expropriation) could be justified under section 36(1).7 In effect, Roux 
argues, the FNB decision might have the effect of sucking all the other stages of 
a constitutional property inquiry into the arbitrariness stage, which would then 
effectively become the only or the principal locus for deciding constitutional 
property disputes, at least in so far as they turn on finding the required balance 
between the protection of individual property and the public interest. Without using 
the term “vortex”, Roux explains this effect most clearly in the following passage: 
“[B]ecause it applies to all deprivations, including expropriations, the [arbitrariness] test will be the 
focus of almost any property clause inquiry. It will be in the application of this test that courts will 
seek to strike the required balance between the individual right to property and the public purpose 
sought to be pursued in, or the public purpose underlying, the law in question.”8 
Accordingly, the vortex effect would effectively render all other stages or factors in 
the section 25 inquiry redundant, except to the extent that three of the FNB questions 
might play a reduced role in some cases.
9
 
The notion of “telescoping” aspects of the constitutional property challenge 
into one dominant stage – also coined by Roux – is used in a slightly different 
but related sense to indicate that the structure of section 25 (as it was interpreted 
in the FNB case) reduces the usual two-stage constitutional inquiry to a single, 
substantive analysis (whether a constitutionally entrenched right has been infringed) 
that effectively renders the second, section 36(1) justification inquiry redundant.10 
This overlaps with Roux’s general vortex thesis to the extent that the substantive 
limitation analysis (which, according to Roux, would turn on the arbitrariness issue) 
pre-empts the justificatory stage of the property inquiry. I return to this particular 
aspect of the vortex argument below.
In this article I address three questions. Paragraph 2 considers whether an 
arbitrariness vortex effect can in fact, with hindsight, be ascribed to the FNB decision. 
Paragraph 3 reviews subsequent case law – particularly from the constitutional 
court – to see whether it provides further examples of the vortex effect that Roux 
identified. Finally, paragraph 4 briefly reviews the negative features of a vortex 
effect in developing section 25 jurisprudence and suggests an interpretation of the 
case law to date that would distinguish true vortex approaches from a contextual 
approach to section 25 that does not display these negative features.
2 The FNB decision: an arbitrariness vortex?
2.1 Introduction
It is not entirely clear whether Roux intended to claim that the FNB decision itself 
reflects the arbitrariness vortex, or that it might inspire (or allow) courts to decide 
subsequent property challenges in a way that would have a vortex effect – quite 
possibly his argument included elements of both. It is probably fair to say that 
7 Cf Roux and Davis “Property” in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: 
The Bill of Rights (2005) 20-9, where the list is simplified to just four questions; Currie and De Waal 
The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 534 (the full FNB list).
8 Roux (n 3) 46-23.
9 Roux (n 3) 46-23. I return to these exceptions in the sections on property and expropriation below.
10 See Roux and Davis (n 7) 20-8, citing De Waal, Currie and Erasmus (n 7) 557.
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Roux’s argument turns on three interlocked points: (1) the FNB decision turns the 
arbitrariness inquiry into a dominant issue that has a vortex effect on the other 
section 25 questions in the FNB case;11 and (2) while the court reserves for itself 
a wide discretion in future cases to vary the level of scrutiny according to the 
circumstances,
12
 (3) the FNB case will allow future decisions to be decided in a way 
that will have the vortex effect, thereby increasingly sidelining other factors and 
focusing on the arbitrariness test.
13
 
It might be useful, some 14 years after the FNB case, to reflect on Roux’s vortex 
thesis, taking into account the substantial body of case law that has emerged since 
Roux’s analysis of the decision. For this purpose, the starting point is the core of the 
vortex thesis, namely that courts “will seek to strike the required balance between 
the individual right to property and the public purpose sought to be pursued in, or 
the public purpose underlying, the law in question” by focusing on just one of the 
questions on which that balance might have been struck,14 thereby either rendering 
the other questions redundant or at least relegating them to a lesser role. The question 
should be, therefore, whether either the FNB case or subsequent case law provides 
evidence to support the claim that the courts (particularly the constitutional court) 
routinely strike the required balance between individual property rights and the 
public interest by focusing on just one of the questions identified in the FNB case, 
while ignoring the others or reducing them to a lesser role. A secondary question, 
if either the FNB decision or subsequent case law indeed supports such a vortex 
analysis, is whether the preferred inquiry in which the balance is usually struck is 
indeed the arbitrariness test, as Roux predicted. This section focuses on the FNB 
decision; subsequent case law is considered in paragraph 3 below.
The main issue to be reviewed is the court’s treatment of the set of questions 
that it identifies in the FNB case as being raised by section 25. The question is 
whether it can be said, from the court’s analysis and discussion of each question 
(or lack thereof) that it in fact strikes the required balance mainly on the basis of 
arbitrariness, sucking the other questions that might also be relevant to that balance 
into the arbitrariness discussion or underplaying them, instead of striking the 
balance in any one (or a combination) of them. The more specific question is whether 
the property, deprivation, expropriation and justification questions are effectively 
sucked into the arbitrariness analysis. As a point of departure, it is assumed that 
avoiding a firm decision, or reaching an answer fairly simply or quickly, on any 
one of these questions does not necessarily confirm the vortex thesis – the latter 
implies that the court specifically strikes the balance between protecting individual 
property and the public interest in the arbitrariness inquiry instead of doing so with 
reference to any of the other questions, in a situation where it could just as well 
(or preferably) have struck the balance on any of them. If it is unnecessary or very 
easy to reach a firm decision on one of these points, for example because the parties 
11 See eg Roux (n 3) 46-2: “[T]he Constitutional Court’s analysis in this case telescoped many of the 
issues that might have been addressed (and in comparative constitutional law are addressed) at other 
stages of the property clause inquiry into this [arbitrariness] stage” (my emphasis).
12 in so doing retaining the ability of subtly shifting the balance of the factors considered. Roux (n 3) 
46-23 – 46-24 describes this flexibility in judicial discretion as one of the two keys to unlocking the 
arbitrariness test (the first being the fact that the arbitrariness test will be the focus of almost all s 25 
inquiries as a result of the vortex effect).
13 See eg Roux (n 3) 46-2: “After FNB, it is apparent that the property clause inquiry will focus on stage 
(3) – the test for arbitrariness.”
14 Roux (n 3) 46-23.
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reached agreement on it or it has been decided in an earlier case, that should not be 
treated as proof either for or against the arbitrariness vortex thesis.
2.2 The constitutional and interpretive context
A first indication in the FNB decision that the required balance between the 
protection of individual rights and the public interest is not struck in the analysis of 
just one question is that the court in the FNB case contextualised the constitutional 
property inquiry in a sweeping historical, constitutional and social framework that 
informs the interpretation of section 25 as a whole. Having identified the seven 
questions that arise in a section 25 dispute,15 the constitutional court16 emphasised 
that (1) section 25 must be interpreted as a whole, in its historical context and in the 
context of the whole constitution; (2) section 25 must always be construed with the 
need for redressing the legacy of past racial discrimination and unequal distribution 
of land in mind, since the constitutional protection of property as an individual right 
is not absolute but subject to societal considerations; (3) one of the purposes of the 
constitution is to establish a society based on democratic values, fundamental human 
rights and social justice; (4) the bill of rights places positive obligations on the state 
in regard to various social and economic rights, and in every individual case section 
25 must be analysed, interpreted and applied with the resulting tension between 
individual rights and social responsibilities as a guiding principle; and (5) section 25 
both protects existing private property rights and serves the public interest, mainly 
in the sphere of land reform but not limited thereto, and strikes a proportionate 
balance between these two functions. This contextualisation of section 25 directly 
informs the proportionality inquiry that characterises the arbitrariness stage, but it 
goes beyond the confines of the arbitrariness inquiry in so far as it also informs the 
analysis and construction of section 25 as a whole. Furthermore, crucial external 
contextualisation factors such as democratic and social justice values, the protection 
of non-property fundamental rights and the constitutional mandate for land reform 
that feature prominently in this contextualisation exercise, play no direct role in the 
arbitrariness test but are relevant to section 25 taken as a whole. By contextualising 
the interpretation of section 25 in this way the constitutional court rendered a 
vortex-promoting interpretation of any part of section 25 undesirable.
2.3 The beneficiaries issue
A second consideration that points in the same direction but that is somewhat 
obscured by the organisation of the FNB judgment is the court’s fairly extensive 
analysis of the beneficiaries issue, which is treated as a preliminary question 
that precedes the identification of the seven questions raised by section 25.17 The 
question, simply put, was whether FNB, a juristic person, was entitled to the property 
rights protected by section 25. With reference to section 8(4) of the constitution
18
 
15 the FNB case (n 2) par 46; for the list of questions see text following n 5 above. For further analysis 
of the decision see Van der Walt “Striving for the better interpretation: a critical reflection on the 
constitutional court’s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” 2004 SALJ 854-878.
16 the FNB case (n 2) par 47-50.
17 the FNB case (n 2) par 41-45. See further Rautenbach “Overview of constitutional court decisions on 
the bill of rights – 2002” 2003 TSAR 166 182.
18 S 8(4) reads: “A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.”
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and its First Certification19 and Hyundai20 judgments, the court concluded that a 
corporate juristic person, more specifically a public company like FNB, should 
enjoy the protection of section 25 because (1) in the vast majority of cases, the 
holders of shares in public companies are natural persons, who are entitled to 
section 25 protection; (2) natural persons form companies and purchase shares in 
companies for a variety of legitimate purposes and the use of companies has come 
to be regarded as indispensable for the conducting of business; consequently, (3) 
denying companies section 25 protection of their property rights would lead to 
grave disruptions and would undermine the democratic state; and (4) “[t]he property 
rights of natural persons can only be fully and properly realised if such rights are 
afforded to companies as well as to natural persons”.
21
 
Far from playing a minor role in an analysis dominated by arbitrariness, this 
passage highlights the court’s effort to strike the required balance between protection 
of individual property and the public interest with reference to considerations and 
factors that extend well beyond arbitrariness, namely the beneficiaries provision in 
section 8(4) of the constitution; the broader context within which rights are protected 
in the constitution; the nature of property holding by juristic persons and its function 
in society; and the constitutional purpose and function of section 25. The court 
described its beneficiaries analysis as a preliminary matter and dealt with it in the 
form of a threshold consideration, but it can hardly be said that its decision on this 
issue was overshadowed by or sucked into the vortex of non-arbitrariness. Instead, 
the court reached its decision on the beneficiaries of section 8(4) in a contextual 
analysis that takes into account the whole of section 25; other provisions in the bill 
of rights; the constitutional and normative framework within which section 25 and 
the constitution must be interpreted; and the social and economic context within 
which the constitution and section 25 function.
2.4 The property question – (FNB question 1)
As far as the property issue is concerned, the constitutional court stated quite early 
in its FNB analysis: 
“At this stage of our constitutional jurisprudence it is, for the reasons given above, practically 
impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive definition of property 
for purposes of section 25. Such difficulties do not, however, arise in the present case. Here it is 
sufficient to hold that ownership of a corporeal movable must – as must ownership of land – lie at 
the heart of our constitutional concept of property, both as regards the nature of the right involved as 
well as the object of the right and must therefore, in principle, enjoy the protection of section 25.”
22
 
This statement can, but does not have to be read as an evasive tactic that shifts 
the crucial part of the decision – striking the balance between individual property 
and the public interest – to the arbitrariness question. Instead, it arguably simply 
frames the specific point for decision in the FNB case, namely whether ownership 
of corporeal movables is property for purposes of section 25. The court considered 
19 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) par 57. 
20 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2001 
1 SA 545 (CC) par 18. 
21 the FNB case (n 2) par 43, 44, 45. 
22 the FNB case (n 2) par 51. See Rautenbach (n 17) 166 182.
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it obvious that ownership of corporeal movables (and of land)
23
 must “lie at the 
heart” of whatever is considered property for purposes of section 25, purely because 
of the centrality of these objects and the right of ownership in them to private-
law property. Consequently, the property question is arguably not a suitable place 
in this particular case to strike the balance, because the legal tradition and socio-
economic custom that dominate the property issue in private law would not leave 
much room for judicial manoeuvring in a transformation-oriented constitutional 
context. According to a widely accepted guideline of constitutional property law, 
objects and rights that are traditionally regarded and protected as property in private 
law are included in the category of constitutional property as a point of departure.
24
 
Courts developing constitutional property law may deviate from private-law 
doctrine, but the point of doing so would be to extend its protection beyond the 
traditional private-law categories and not to restrict constitutional recognition 
of those categories as property.
25
 In effect, the FNB decision simply follows the 
well-established constitutional property principle that it is not suitable to strike 
the required section 25 balance in the property inquiry when the dispute involves 
objects and rights, such as ownership of land or corporeal movables, that are clearly 
and without exception treated and protected as property in private law. In those 
cases, the property question is still asked,26 but it assumes the form and function 
of a simple threshold, whereafter the inquiry proceeds to substantive questions that 
concern the justification of regulatory restrictions imposed on that property. The 
reason for recognising as constitutional property, as a point of departure, objects 
and rights that are traditionally recognised and protected as property in private law 
is significant. I return to the point in the concluding paragraph 4 below.
There is an interesting twist to the property analysis in the FNB decision. In 
addition to the general observations referred to already, the court rejected an 
argument to the effect that the proper balance between the protection of property 
and the public interest should be struck on the property question in this particular 
case because the property interest in issue (ownership of movables for security 
purposes) was a contractual device devoid of any actual use interest. This kind 
of ownership interest, the respondents argued, does not deserve the protection 
of section 25. On this point, it might appear as if the court shifted the process of 
balancing the protection of the particular property interest and the public interest to 
the arbitrariness question of the inquiry, thereby confirming the vortex thesis: 
“The fact that an owner of a corporeal movable makes no, or limited use of the object in question, 
is irrelevant to the categorisation of the object as constitutional property. It may be relevant to 
deciding whether a deprivation thereof is arbitrary and, if it is, whether such deprivation is justified 
under section 36 of the Constitution. We are here dealing only with corporeal movables and it is 
unnecessary to go any wider.” 
27
 
23 As far as land is concerned, the question has always been not whether land is constitutional property, 
but whether and how far constitutional property extends beyond land. Hence the provision in 
s 25(4)(b) that “[f]or purposes of this section, property is not limited to land”. 
24 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 187 summarises the argument; compare Roux (n 
3) 46-10 – 46-11.
25 This principle is identifiable in any jurisdiction with an established body of constitutional property 
law, but see eg Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 
152-153 on the case law of the German federal constitutional court.
26 Even when the property question is more or less uncontested in a particular case, that does not mean 
that it is ignored or that just any interest is accepted as property: see eg Van der Walt (n 24) 119 
(German law); 123 (US law). 
27 the FNB case (n 2) par 54.
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However, in fact the court decided even this part of the property issue on its own 
merit and did not allow it to be sucked into the arbitrariness question. The security-
interest argument, the court concluded, misconstrues the nature and function of 
ownership as a security right:
“The argument moreover incorrectly conflates the legal right and the commercial interest that FNB 
has in the vehicles in question. At the time when FNB concluded the relevant contracts it was 
the owner of all the vehicles. The ‘reservation of ownership’ is not what the inquiry should focus 
on. This is no more than the description of the effect of a contractual term in the agreement. The 
fact that the agreements contemplate a stage when FNB might cease to be owner cannot affect 
the characterisation of its right of ownership for as long as it remains owner. Instead, it is FNB’s 
ownership of the vehicle, and nothing else, that entitles it to treat the vehicle as an execution object 
in the event of its debtor defaulting under the agreement in question, or affords it a special advantage 
in insolvency. This is the essence of why a lease of moveables is viable; there is no need for further 
security since the ownership of the asset leased provides adequate security.”28
“Neither the subjective interest of the owner in the thing owned, nor the economic value of the right 
of ownership, having regard to the other terms of the agreement, can determine the characterisation 
of the right. It does not matter that the owner would rather have the purchase price than the vehicle, 
nor that the economic value of the right of ownership might be small when the contract term draws 
to an end. A speculator has no less a right of ownership in goods purchased exclusively for resale 
merely because she has no subjective interest in them but sees them only as objects that will produce 
money on resale. I accordingly conclude that the right of ownership that FNB has in the vehicles in 
question constitutes property for purposes of section 25.”29
The court went further than simply endorsing private-law doctrine, though; it 
emphasised that the constitutional protection of ownership of land and corporeal 
movables – property objects and rights that have been identified as the core of 
constitutional property on the strength of their status and function in private law – 
must be understood in its proper constitutional context. Recognising these objects 
and rights as constitutional property does not insulate them against regulatory 
interference, since property also serves the public good in the constitutional 
context.
30 In other words, the court identified and recognised the property objects 
and interests that are relevant to this case – specifically ownership of corporeal 
movables – as property for purposes of section 25 on the strength of their status 
and function in private law (in other words, not on the basis of arbitrariness), and 
added (again without reference to arbitrariness) that recognition of those property 
objects and rights as constitutional property does not insulate them against public-
interest regulatory deprivation or expropriation. That defines both aspects of the 
recognition of ownership of corporeal movables as constitutional property – its 
protection and its susceptibility to social, public-interest limitation – on the strength 
of factors and considerations that are germane to the property question as such (the 
private law status and function of ownership of land and corporeal movables) and 
to the broader section 25 and constitutional context (constitutional property is not 
insulated against public-interest regulation), and not on the basis of arbitrariness 
logic. Since the constitution- and section 25-driven combination of these two aspects 
of constitutional recognition as property established, in the property inquiry, the 
required balance between the protection of individual property and the public 
28 the FNB case (n 2) par 55.
29 the FNB case (n 2) par 56.
30 the FNB case (n 2) par 52.
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interest, one must conclude that this section of the court’s decision in the FNB case 
does not present an example of the arbitrariness vortex at work.
Roux recognised that the property question might feature in section 25 challenges, 
despite the arbitrariness vortex, in a reduced role: the “threshold question concerning 
the meaning of property may serve to eliminate claims based purely on the impact 
of the law on the claimant’s wealth, rather than on any particular right in property or 
legally recognised incident of ownership”.
31
 In other words, in some cases it might 
be established in the property inquiry, as a threshold issue, that the property interest 
involved is not “any particular right in property or legally recognised incident of 
ownership” but the claimant’s wealth as such, and in those cases the property inquiry 
might be used to strike the required balance between the protection of individual 
property and the public interest by eliminating claims that should not reach the 
arbitrariness inquiry. 
Two points are relevant to this observation. Firstly, this reduced-role non-vortex 
function of the property inquiry does not apply to discrete property interests that are 
clearly established in private law, such as ownership of land or corporeal movables 
– in that regard, Roux echoes the FNB decision on the security-interest argument 
discussed above. Secondly, it is a well-established principle of comparative 
constitutional property law that constitutional property clauses do not protect 
a property holder’s general wealth but discrete property interests that have been 
acquired according to normal law.32 In that regard, Roux merely confirms widely 
shared constitutional property doctrine.
33
 In one sense, reaching a decision on this 
point does not require balancing of individual interests and the public interest in 
the property inquiry – deciding that general wealth or general financial status is not 
recognised as property for purposes of the property clause should be just as easy, 
on the basis of established doctrine, as deciding that discrete property interests that 
are recognised and protected as property in private law should be recognised. Put 
differently, both the exclusion of general wealth and the inclusion of established 
property interests result from threshold-type inquiries and not necessarily from 
a principled balancing of individual interests and the public interest. From that 
perspective these two points are not strong indications of exceptions to the vortex 
thesis but rather indications that the property question will sometimes assume 
the form and function of a simple threshold question that leaves the balancing of 
individual property interests and the public interest to substantive analysis dealing 
with the justification of imposing regulatory restrictions on property rights. In 
the concluding paragraph 4 below I argue that these threshold decisions to either 
preclude altogether or to leave a substantive decision on the protection of a particular 
interest for a later part of the inquiry neither confirm nor create exceptions to the 
arbitrariness vortex thesis.
31 Roux (n 3) 46-23.
32 See eg Van der Walt (n 24) 119 text accompanying n 120 (German law), 123 text accompanying n 134 
(US law).
33 The point was raised but not decided in Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 
1 SA 400 (CC) par 82 84. The minister argued that the fact of incurred expenditure (in other words, 
effects of regulatory action on one’s general wealth) is not property for purposes of s 25; the court 
found it unnecessary to decide the property issue.
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2.5 Deprivation (FNB question 2) and expropriation (FNB questions 5 and 6)
Two features of the FNB decision are its wide definition of deprivation as “any 
interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property”
34
 and the 
fact that deprivation is presented as an overarching genus that includes expropriation 
as a species.
35
 Primarily because of the second feature, the court declared that the 
starting point for all section 25 challenges is section 25(1): the analysis will only 
reach the point where a limitation is considered as an expropriation in terms of the 
requirements in section 25(2)-(3) once it had either passed scrutiny under (did not 
infringe) section 25(1) or if the infringement is justifiable in terms of section 36.36
Compared to the property inquiry, the lack of contextual, constitutional or social 
analysis in the FNB case’s deprivation inquiry is striking. The court presented its 
wide definition of deprivation more or less as a matter of simple logic, focusing on 
the conceptual distinction between deprivation and expropriation and relying on 
nothing more than a handful of academic references. The definitional distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation that the court proposed, and particularly 
its implications for the analytical rhythm of section 25 challenges that the court 
presented, is perhaps the strongest indication of the arbitrariness vortex effect that 
Roux identified. According to the analytical structure or methodology that the 
court set out so emphatically, the starting point for all constitutional challenges 
under section 25 is always the deprivation issue in section 25(1) – in other words, 
the first question is always whether a deprivation of property is arbitrary. If the 
deprivation infringes section 25(1) (in other words, if it is arbitrary) and cannot 
be justified under section 36 that is the end of the matter – the law that authorises 
the deprivation is unconstitutional. If that law happens to deal with expropriation, 
and if it happens not to comply with the expropriation requirements in section 
25(2)-(3), it is highly probable that those shortcomings would already render the 
law unconstitutional in terms of the section 25(1) arbitrariness inquiry. If it does 
comply with the formal section 25(2)-(3) expropriation requirements, it is unlikely 
to offend either the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness or the section 25(2)-(3) validity 
requirements, and it will therefore probably never be the source of a section 25 
challenge. Effectively, constitutional analysis of the validity of an expropriation 
in terms of the requirements in section 25(2)-(3) is therefore always sucked into 
the section 25(1) arbitrariness inquiry, unless the deprivation that it causes can be 
justified under section 36. However, as appears below, it is unlikely that an arbitrary 
deprivation can in fact be justified in terms of section 36. To this extent, Roux’s 
arbitrariness vortex thesis seems to be confirmed by the FNB decision.
If the courts were to decide a case dealing with the section 25(2)-(3) expropriation 
requirements strictly according to the guidelines set out in the FNB case, the result 
would be an example of Roux’s arbitrariness vortex effect: a constitutional challenge 
against a law that authorises expropriation would be decided in terms of the section 
25(2)-(3) expropriation requirements only if the deprivation that the expropriation 
inevitably also causes (in terms of the genus-species definition in the FNB case) is 
either not arbitrary (which will be the case only if the expropriation complies with 
the section 25(2)-(3) requirements) or if it is arbitrary but justifiable under section 
36 (which is highly unlikely). Effectively, if the approach set out in the FNB case 
is followed strictly, all section 25 challenges against expropriation laws would be 
34 the FNB case (n 2) par 57. See Rautenbach (n 17) 166 182.
35 the FNB case (n 2) par 58.
36 the FNB case (n 2) par 58-60.
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decisively dealt with in (sucked into) the section 25(1) arbitrariness inquiry. In other 
words, the required balance between the protection of individual property and the 
public interest in expropriation would in principle never be struck in a section 25(2)-(3) 
expropriation inquiry, even when the case at hand is in fact an expropriation case. 
If the analytical rhythm that the FNB decision proposed as if it were logically 
inevitable were indeed followed strictly, that would confirm Roux’s arbitrariness 
vortex observation, at least as far as the effect on expropriation analysis is concerned.
However, Roux qualified his vortex thesis with the observation that courts may 
find it necessary or desirable in some cases to go to expropriation issues (either 
FNB question 5 or question 6) directly, instead of via the non-arbitrariness and 
justification route. The first possibility will arise when a court finds it necessary 
to consider more closely “the distinction between deprivation and expropriation 
(to determine whether the additional duty to pay just and equitable compensation 
arises […])”; the second when a court finds it useful to inquire “into the adequacy 
of compensation (where this stage provides a more nuanced method for balancing 
private and public interests in property)”.
37
 In other words, Roux foresaw the 
possibility that a court might bypass the seemingly strict rhythm described in the 
FNB case in some instances and, instead of first establishing whether a particular 
regulatory limitation of property amounts to an arbitrary deprivation, go directly to 
the question whether the deprivation amounts to expropriation, with the result that 
compensation is required in terms of section 25(2); or whether the compensation 
that is provided for is just and equitable according to the requirements in section 
25(3). Both would establish significant exceptions to the arbitrariness vortex. Taken 
together, they establish such an important qualification of what Roux perceived as 
the rule that he concluded that the FNB case’s analytical rhythm or methodology “is 
not a true algorithm” since at least one step in it can be bypassed.
38
 
Since expropriation was not at stake in the FNB case, it is difficult to establish 
whether the court intended to establish a “true algorithm” that would inexorably 
follow the analytical rhythm at the heart of the vortex thesis. Judging from the 
summary statements in the FNB case where the court described the relationship 
between deprivation and expropriation that indeed seems to have been the intention, 
but it is difficult to rely on a decision with such a limited factual scope for strong 
conclusions on this point. As appears from the discussion of subsequent case 
law in section 3 below, the court does not consider itself bound to such a strong 
algorithmic interpretation of its decision in the FNB case and it is indeed willing to 
bypass the arbitrariness inquiry altogether and decide certain cases on the basis of 
FNB question 5 or 6 expropriation issues. In either event, it makes little difference 
whether one regards these expropriation examples as exceptional cases where the 
court abandons its own strict algorithm by skipping one stage to go directly to 
another, or as counter-examples on which the vortex thesis falls down because they 
demonstrate instances where the court prefers to strike the required balance between 
protection of individual property and the public interest outside of the arbitrariness 
inquiry – in either form these examples suggest that the FNB decision does not 
prescribe the logic of the arbitrariness vortex strictly. When it is fairly obvious that 
the challenged limitation of property is or may be expropriatory in nature, the court 
may prefer to strike the balance on FNB question 5 (by holding that there has been 
an expropriation that requires just and equitable compensation) or FNB question 6 
37 Roux (n 3) 46-24.
38 Roux (n 3) 46-4.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 3 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
422 VAN DER WALT
(by deciding whether the compensation on offer is just and equitable as required by 
section 25(2)-(3)). By way of conclusion, it is probably fair to say that while the FNB 
decision seems to create a conceptual framework, in its genus-species description of 
the relationship between deprivation and expropriation, to support the arbitrariness 
vortex thesis, it does not provide any strong proof of the working of that vortex, 
because the case does not involve expropriation. Any judgment on this point must 
therefore be informed by analysis of later case law.
2.6 Arbitrariness
In view of Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis it stands to reason that, at the very 
least, the arbitrariness stage would be an important locus for striking the desired 
balance between the protection of individual property and the public interest. Given 
the nature of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1),39 it is to be expected 
that the arbitrariness test would always involve consideration of the balance that is 
struck between individual property interests and the public interest. It is therefore 
not surprising that the description of the arbitrariness inquiry in the FNB case is 
explicitly and primarily concerned with this balance: “a deprivation of property is 
‘arbitrary’ as meant by section 25 when the ‘law’ referred to in section 25(1) does not 
provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally 
unfair”.
40
 The “complexity of relationships” to be considered in determining 
whether the authorising law provides sufficient reason for the deprivation41 pivots 
on the relationship between means (the deprivation) and ends (the purpose of the 
law) and between the purpose of the deprivation (public interest) and the person 
whose property is affected, taking into account the nature of the property and the 
extent of the deprivation (individual right). Consequently, where the property is 
ownership of land or a corporeal movable, or when the deprivation embraces all 
the incidents of ownership rather than only some incidents and those only partially, 
a more compelling purpose will have to be established for the authorising law to 
constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation.
It is striking that the court supports its description of arbitrariness with contextual 
constitutional and social argument similar to what is relied on in the property inquiry 
(but that is absent from the deprivation inquiry)42 and with extensive comparative 
analysis.
43
 From the contextual considerations, the court concludes that (1) context 
is crucial, in the sense that the concept “arbitrary” appears in and must be construed 
as part of a comprehensive and coherent bill of rights in a comprehensive and 
coherent constitution;
44
 (2) context includes the jurisprudential context in which 
the constitution came into existence and functions, including international law 
and foreign law;
45
 (3) the historical context in which the property clause came into 
existence is one of conquest and taking of land in circumstances which, to this 
day, are a source of pain and tension; this context and the constitutional necessity 
to regulate restitution and other forms of redress are relevant to the fact that the 
purpose of section 25 is not merely to protect private property but also to advance 
39 S 25(1) provides: “No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”
40 the FNB case (n 2) par 100. See Rautenbach (n 17) 166 182-183.
41 Set out in some detail in the crucial par 100 of the FNB case (n 2).
42 the FNB case (n 2) par 63-66.
43 the FNB case (n 2) par 71-96.
44 the FNB case (n 2) par 63.
45 the FNB case (n 2) par 64.
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the public interest in relation to property.
46
 The comparative analysis of foreign 
law indicates that the court’s contextual interpretation of the non-arbitrariness 
requirement is justified.47 
The constitutional court applied its arbitrariness test to the deprivation of property 
brought about by section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 with a 
surprising amount of further discussion of foreign law,
48
 but essentially the court 
followed the approach it had set out before, namely to determine whether there is 
sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation on all the relevant facts of the particular 
case. The court described the purpose of the deprivation, namely to secure payment 
of a customs debt, as “a legitimate and important legislative purpose, essential for 
the financial well-being of the country and in the interest of all its inhabitants”.49 
However, having considered the “complexity of relationships” set out in paragraph 
100, the court concluded that section 114 “casts the net far too wide” because it 
“sanctions the total deprivation of a person’s property under circumstances where (a) such person 
has no connection with the transaction giving rise to the customs debt; (b) where such property 
also has no connection with the customs debt; and (c) where such person has not transacted with or 
placed the customs debtor in possession of the property under circumstances that have induced the 
Commissioner to act to her detriment in relation to the incurring of the customs debt.”
50
In the absence of any nexus of this kind, there was insufficient reason for the 
deprivation authorised by section 114 and accordingly it was arbitrary for purposes 
of section 25(1) and constituted a limitation of the right.
51
 Although nothing was said 
explicitly in the section dealing with the application of the test to section 114 of the 
act, it is clear that the level of scrutiny in this case was closer to the proportionality 
end of the scale because of the impact and scope of the deprivation, which resulted 
in the affected owner losing ownership of its corporeal movables. 
The focus and contours of the arbitrariness inquiry are therefore shaped by 
contextual factors that suggest that this is a significant part of a section 25 challenge. 
It is true that the arbitrariness inquiry may be subject to variations in the level 
of scrutiny in specific cases,52 but deciding whether there is sufficient reason to 
46 the FNB case (n 2) par 64.
47 the FNB case (n 2) par 97: “there are appropriate circumstances where it is permissible for legislation, 
in the broader public interest, to deprive persons of property without payment of compensation”, 
and par 98: “for the validity of such deprivation, there must be an appropriate relationship between 
means and ends, between the sacrifice the individual is asked to make and the public purpose this is 
intended to serve. It is one that is not limited to an enquiry into mere rationality, but is less strict than 
a full and exacting proportionality examination.”
48 the FNB case (n 2) par 101-107. Cf the critical remarks of Roux (n 3) 46-23.
49 the FNB case (n 2) par 108.
50 the FNB case (n 2) par 108.
51 the FNB case (n 2) par 109.
52 In a sense, the whole of the court’s analysis in the FNB case (n 2) par 61-66 is directed at this 
point. The conclusion that the arbitrariness standard “is more demanding than an enquiry into mere 
rationality” but simultaneously “a narrower and less intrusive concept than that of the proportionality 
evaluation required by the limitation provisions of section 36” appears and is justified in par 65, 66 
(“[i]n certain circumstances the legislative deprivation might be such that no more than a rational 
connection between means and ends would be required, while in others the ends would have to be 
more compelling to prevent the deprivation from being arbitrary”), par 98, 100(g) (“[d]epending 
on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the property in question and 
the extent of its deprivation, there may be circumstances when sufficient reason is established by, 
in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in others this might 
only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by section 36(1) of the 
Constitution”).
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warrant a particular deprivation of property is a matter to be decided on all the 
relevant facts of each particular case.
53
 In short, one might infer from this statement, 
once it has been determined that there was a deprivation of property as meant in 
section 25(1), arbitrariness analysis of the kind foreseen in the FNB decision and 
at a suitable level of scrutiny, based on the relevant facts of a particular case, is 
a significant part of the section 25 challenge that should complete the process of 
striking the desired balance between individual property and the public interest. As 
appears from section 4 below, this is an important conclusion that underlines the 
significance of Roux’s observation, albeit in an indirect and roundabout way.
2.7 Justification
The constitutional court has adopted a two-stage approach to constitutional 
challenges in general, according to which the first question in any constitutional 
challenge is whether a constitutional right has been limited and the second 
whether that limitation can be justified.54 For purposes of section 25, the first stage 
involves the question whether the property right in section 25 has been limited 
by a deprivation or expropriation that does not satisfy the requirements in either 
section 25(1) or 25(2)-(3), and the second whether that limitation can be justified in 
terms of section 36.
55 Because of the broad, genus-species definition of deprivation 
and expropriation and the layered, contextual approach to non-arbitrariness that 
the FNB case adopted, it has become clear that the relationship between the two 
stages of a constitutional challenge is problematic in property challenges. Academic 
authors pointed out, in varying terminology but generally to the same effect, that 
once a court has established, in terms of the FNB test, that a deprivation of property 
is arbitrary it would be problematic to justify the same deprivation in terms of 
section 36. Consequently it has been said that the two stages of the constitutional 
challenge are “telescoped” into one by the FNB decision
56
 or that it is unlikely 
that usual section 36 justification analysis (second stage) could apply to section 25 
arbitrariness challenges.
57
To some extent, the point is a logical one that is not really affected or caused by 
the FNB decision; part of the problem simply results from the fact that section 25 
requires a deprivation or expropriation of property, just like section 36(1) requires a 
limitation, to be authorised by law of general application. Logically, if a court should 
find that a deprivation is not authorised by law of general application, there is simply 
no way that the deprivation could be justified in terms of section 36(1), regardless of 
anything that was decided in the FNB case. However, apart from this formal validity 
requirement, the factors (the “complexity of relationships”) that the court set out in 
53 the FNB case (n 2) par 100 (h).
54 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 100-102; Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 
SA 984 (CC) par 44.
55 S 36(1) provides: “36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including 
 a. the nature of the right; 
 b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
 c. the nature and extent of the limitation; 
 d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
 e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
56 Roux (n 3) 46-20; Roux and Davis (n 7) 20-9.
57 Van der Walt (n 24) 78-79.
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the FNB case to establish whether the law that authorises a deprivation
58
 provides 
sufficient reason for the deprivation (to prevent it from being arbitrary) significantly 
overlap with the factors enumerated in section 36 to be taken into account to 
establish whether a limitation of a constitutional right could be justified. Much of 
the non-arbitrariness analysis prescribed in the FNB case turns on the relationship 
between means and ends, which is echoed in the justification factors enumerated 
in section 36(1). The substantive core of the non-arbitrariness test in the FNB case 
concerns the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the 
affected right and the extent of the deprivation; that is almost identical to the factors 
in section 36(1). Consequently, once a deprivation has failed the non-arbitrariness 
test as it is set out in the FNB case, it is unlikely that it could pass virtually the same 
test in terms of section 36(1). 
This conclusion is not affected significantly by the variable level of scrutiny 
foreseen in the FNB case, nor is it affected much by the somewhat enigmatic phrase 
“[a] limitation [that] is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom” used in section 36(1). As the FNB 
decision explains, either a more rationality-oriented or a more proportionality-
oriented assessment is possible with reference to the non-arbitrariness factors – the 
former would simply focus more on the means-end balancing and the latter more on 
the contextual, proportionality-of-effect balancing. The same is true for the factors 
in section 36(1): if the level of scrutiny tends towards rationality, the focus would 
probably not fall on the nature and extent of the limitation and less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose, but rather on the means-end balance. And, although the 
list in section 36(1) is open-ended, the question whether a particular limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom is always going to be answered with reference to the listed 
factors and not on the basis of sweeping normative judgments about democratic 
values, human dignity, equality or freedom that are completely unrelated to the 
purpose of the limitation, the means selected to achieve that purpose, and the effect 
that it has on the affected rights holder. In short, in view of the overlaps between 
the validity requirements in section 25 and the justification requirements in section 
36(1), and given the particular meaning attached to non-arbitrariness in the FNB 
decision, it is difficult to imagine an example in which a deprivation could fail the 
non-arbitrariness test and still be justified in terms of section 36(1).
This observation obviously supports Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis to the 
extent that the whole section 36 justification analysis, and with it the customary 
second stage of a constitutional challenge, is effectively “telescoped” or “sucked” 
into the first-stage arbitrariness test. However, the FNB decision acknowledged 
but refused to simply accept this conclusion and, once it had concluded that the 
deprivation of property authorised by section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 
of 1964 was indeed arbitrary,
59
 it proceeded to an admittedly somewhat summary 
second-stage justification analysis.60 Despite the difficulty of conceiving of a way 
in which an arbitrary deprivation might be saved by the justification analysis, the 
court pointed out that section 36 draws no distinction between any rights in the bill 
of rights, nor does either the text or the purpose of section 36 suggest that any right 
in the bill of rights is excluded from limitation under its provisions. Since the court 
did not find it necessary to decide this question finally, it assumed, without deciding, 
58 the FNB case (n 2) par 100.
59 the FNB case (n 2) par 109.
60 the FNB case (n 2) par 110-112.
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that an infringement of section 25(1) of the constitution is subject to the provisions 
of section 36, only to conclude that in the case at hand, the arbitrary deprivation 
of property authorised by section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act could not be 
justified in terms of section 36(1).61
It seems fair to say that the logical effect of the formulation of section 25 and 
section 36(1), combined with the content and structure given to non-arbitrariness 
analysis in the FNB decision, is to effectively render section 36 justification analysis 
redundant, at least for purposes of section 25(1) deprivations that are held to be 
arbitrary. This effect is indeed an example of Roux’s arbitrariness vortex, at least as 
far as the justification part of the analysis (FNB question 4) is concerned. However, 
while the FNB decision acknowledged this logical conundrum it declined the 
opportunity to make any final finding on it. Any firm conclusions on this aspect of 
the vortex thesis must therefore be based on analysis of subsequent case law.
2.8 Conclusions on the arbitrariness vortex in the FNB case
From the analysis so far it is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions 
regarding Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis and its role in the FNB decision. Firstly, 
it is reasonably clear that the analytical rhythm or methodology for interpreting and 
applying section 25 set out in the FNB decision is the backdrop, if not the cause, of 
Roux’s vortex thesis and that it also informs any observations about the role that the 
arbitrariness vortex played in the FNB decision or might play in future. If section 
25 challenges are structured according to the set of seven questions listed in the 
FNB case (perhaps plus the beneficiaries issue), any perceived tendency to depart 
from the sequence suggested by or embodied in that list, and particularly to focus 
on any one item in the list to the exclusion of others or with the effect of relegating 
them to a less significant role, would result in the kind of effect that Roux described. 
The nature, composition and function of the list of questions in FNB is therefore of 
primary analytical importance.
Secondly, it can be said that Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis receives support 
from the FNB judgment at least in so far as it has become clear that the structure 
and wording of section 25(1) and section 36(1), combined with the meaning that the 
FNB decision attached to the arbitrariness test, create the distinct logical possibility 
that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to justify a deprivation in terms of 
section 36(1) once it has been branded arbitrary in terms of section 25(1). The effect 
is that section 36(1) justification analysis is effectively “telescoped” or “sucked” into 
the section 25(1) arbitrariness test. However, in the FNB case the court declined the 
invitation to reach a final decision on the point and assumed, without deciding, that 
section 36 justification applies to all rights, including section 25. It can therefore 
perhaps be said that the arbitrariness vortex thesis gained strong logical support in 
the FNB case, but no judicial support, as far as the telescoping of the two stages of 
the constitutional challenge is concerned.
The methodology or analytical rhythm for analysis of section 25 proposed in 
the FNB case is perhaps the strongest indication of a potential arbitrariness vortex, 
since that methodology suggests that problematic expropriation laws might always 
be considered as authority for arbitrary deprivation first and might stumble over the 
arbitrariness hurdle, never to reach expropriation inquiry. However, since the FNB 
case did not deal with expropriation, no firm conclusions on this point are possible 
from the decision. It has been pointed out in the academic literature, with some 
61 the FNB case (n 2) par 113.
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hindsight gained from other decisions, that this arbitrariness vortex effect might 
well be watered down in cases that obviously deal with expropriation, to the extent 
that courts might be willing to bypass the arbitrariness analysis and go straight to 
expropriation analysis. 
Apart from these rather hesitant observations, it must be added that in the FNB 
decision the constitutional court followed the methodology it had set out as far as the 
property question is concerned, and did not allow the arbitrariness issue to dominate 
its decision on the property question. Instead, it considered wider contextual, 
constitutional and social factors that are extraneous to the arbitrariness issue in 
reaching its decision on the property question. Moreover, the court followed the 
same contextual approach in deciding the beneficiaries issue, which was seen as a 
preliminary question and not included in the list of seven property-related questions. 
The deprivation question was decided quite summarily, without reference to the 
same contextual factors, but also without reference to arbitrariness issues. 
In sum, the indications that some form of arbitrariness vortex logic dominated 
or even influenced the court in the FNB decision itself are rather weak. In fact, the 
court’s analysis on the issues of beneficiaries and on the property question shows 
that it followed a contextual approach to the interpretation of section 25(1) that took 
into consideration constitutional, social and historical factors that frame the whole 
of section 25 in its broader constitutional setting, instead of allowing any of its 
discrete parts to dominate the interpretation of the whole. The two points on which 
some form of vortex effect does seem to become possible or even likely on the 
basis of the court’s approach to section 25, namely the genus-species definition of 
the relationship between deprivation and expropriation and the distinction between 
the two stages of a constitutional challenge, did not in fact produce any firm 
evidence of an arbitrariness vortex in the decision because the case did not deal with 
expropriation at all and the court insisted on following the two-stages methodology.
[to be concluded]
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